US Military Bases & Assistance Agreements (1947) - Independence with Strings: From U.S. Colony to U.S. Neocolony

"...the role of U.S. overseas bases in the world -bases in the Philippines among them-- is to "act as magnets for enemy attacks, thus dispersing and weakening his threat to our cities and fixed installations." --Hanson W. Baldwin (1903-1991), U.S. Naval Academy Class 1924, N.Y. Times Military Editor, stated in the NY Times Weekly 2/17/57 & 8/18/57 - as quoted by Claro M. Recto

"In time of peace, foreign bases serve as protection for foreign investments within the country where the bases are established." - Claro M. Recto

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Hi All,

Both the U.S-proposed Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreements were railroaded for approval within days after the Philippines amended its Constitution (remember that the U.S. made all payment to the Philippines for WW2 war damages dependent on Filipino acceptance of the Bell Trade Act-1946 (Parity Rights). 

These military agreements turned effective control of the Philippine armed forces over to the U.S. since they essentially kept or reestablished the military over-lordship as during the colonial era.

These American bases later became important staging areas for the American War in Vietnam and CIA plots against Indonesia in 1958 and 1965, etc. Other disastrous effects to civilians living near the bases: being shot dead while scavenging for scraps by American soldiers, who claimed they thought they were wild animals/boars, sexual assaults by soldiers (victims never got justice) as most recently highlighted by the Subic Rape Case , rise of drug and sex industry, etc.

Currently, we do not see such large facilities/bases; but with the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) the presence of American troops in Philippine territory, seemingly for the (unending) Balikatan exercises, is still unconstitutional (Article 18, Section 25, 1987 Constitution). The VFA is the new Pentagon instrument of establishing foreign bases that are small and austere, aka “Lily-Pads” in its jargon.

Despite this knowledge, a few months ago, our senators approved  similar VFA agreement  with Australia. This recent agreement with Australia, I think and believe, is part of the current US military strategy of "multilateralism" via our subservient Philippine rulers.

Most of our current politicians/senators, consistent to many ilks of our political past who were devoid of nationalism, have demonstrated that they also are similar sell-outs and beholden to foreigners, essentially work against our national sovereignty and therefore, to the native citizenry. 

The VFAs are made ostensibly to improve our military capability for "national security" and "disaster relief works."  Under the JUSMAG "training" and tutelage for over 65+ years to the present, are officers of our armed forces still incompetents and incapable to stand on its own?  I doubt so.  It is simply our carry-over of colonial mentality and mendicancy; being beholden to the white race, be they Americans, Australians, Europeans, etc. 

We native Filipinos, our native soldiers, are as good as any soldier of any race, including those of the whites we put on a pedestal. We do not need such advisory presence from any foreign country; who obviously know us native Filipinos more than we know ourselves, and use their understanding to effectively and efficiently exploit our Filipino naïveté and sentimentality.

It is enraging and sad that our fellow native Filipino majority who are mired in generational poverty and thus uninformed; the condition that allows the native bureaucrats, politicians and like-minded officials to make such dealings and perpetuate all the inherent social ills and injustices created, as our history has shown, wherever these foreign troops are.

- Bert

Addendum 12/08/2012: Click to read:

US Military Bases & Military Assistance Agreements (1947) – How Approved (Part 1 of 2)



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RP-US MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT, 
March 14, 1947 (Key Provisions)

Editors' Introduction (1987): The Military Bases Agreement provided the U.S. with extensive military facilities in the Philippines for a term of 99 years.The two major facilities, Clark Air Base and Subic naval base, were immense facilities. Clark covered 130,000 acres, bigger than the entire island of Grenada; Subic included a whole city -Olongapo- within its jurisdiction. The Agreement prohibited the Philippines from granting base rights to any other country and placed no restrictions on the uses to which the U.S. could put the bases, nor the types of weapons that it could deploy or store there. Finally, the Agreement allowed the U.S. to recruit Filipino volunteers into the U.S> Armed Forces.

Over the years, some of the provisions of the bases agreement have been changed. Some of the extensive base lands have been returned to the Philippine government, including the city of Olongapo, but the bases remain the largest U.S. military facilities outside of the U.S. The term of the Agreement was changed in 1966 to expire in 1991.

In 1959, the Bohlen-Serrano exchange of notes, the U.S. committed itself to consult with the RP before deploying long-range missiles on the bases or using the bases for combat purposes unrelated to mutual defense. The latter provision did not apply to logistic or staging activities nor to U.S. naval forces operating directly from RP.

In any event, however, none of these changes altered the essential use of the bases as springboards for US intervention in Asia. According the US officials in 1972, "nowhere in the world are we able to use our military bases with less restrictions than we do in the Philippines."

Finally, it should be noted that Filipinos continue to be recruited into the US Armed Forces, where they typically serve as servants to top US Navy officers.


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Article I: Grant of Bases

1. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the Philippines) grants to the Government of America (hereinafter referred to as the United States) the right to retain the use of the bases in the Philippines listed in Annex A attached hereto.
2. The Philippines agrees to permit the United States, upon notice to the Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in Annex B as the United States determines to be required by military necessity.
3. The Philippines agrees to enter into negotiations with the United States at the latter's request, to permit the United States to expand such bases, to exchange such bases for other bases, to acquire additional bases, or relinquish rights to bases, as any of such exigencies may be required by military necessity.

ARTICLE II: Mutual Cooperation

1. It is mutually agreed that the Armed Forces of the Philippines may serve on the United States bases and that the Armed Forces of the United States may serve on Philippine military establishments whenever such conditions appear beneficial as mutually determined by the armed forces of both countries.

Article III: Description of Rights

It is mutually agreed that that the United States  shall have the rights, power, and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them, or appropriate for their control.

Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter alia, the right, power and authority:

(a) to construct (including the dredging and filling), operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison and control the bases;

(b) to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances and anchorages, and to construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges affording access to the bases;

(c) to control (including the right to prohibit) in so far as may be required for the efficient operation and safety of the bases, and within the limits of military necessity, anchorages, moorings, landings, takeoffs, movements and operation of ships and waterborne craft, craft and other vehicles on water, in the air or land comprising or in the vicinity of the bases;

(d) the right to acquire, as may be agreed between the two governments, such rights of way, and to construct thereon, as may be required for military purpose, wire and radio communications facilities, including submarine and subterranean cables, pipelines and spur tracks from railroad to bases, and the right, as may be agreed upon between the two governments to construct the necessary facilities;

(e) to construct, install, maintain  and employ on any base any type of facilities, weapons, substance, device, vehicle or vehicle on or under the ground, in the air or on or under the water that may be requisite or appropriate, including meteorological systems, aerial and water navigation lights, radio and rdar apparatus and electronic devices of any desired power, type of emission and frequency.

Article VI. Maneuver and Other Areas

The United states shall, subject to previous agreement with the Philippines, have the right to use land and coastal sea areas of appropriate size and location for periodic maneuvers, for additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery ranges, and for such intermediate airfields as may be required for safe and efficient air operations. Operations in such areas shall be carried on with  due regard and safeguards for the public safety.

Article XIII. Jurisdiction

1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base, except where the offender and the offended parties are both Philippine citizens, not members of the Armed Forces of the United States on active duty or the offense is against the security of the Philippines, and the offender is a Philippine citizen;(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the Armed Forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the Armed forces of the United States against the security of the United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside the bases by any member of the Armed Forces of the United States. Not withstanding the foregoing provisions, it is mutually agreed that in time of war the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by the members of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines.

Article XXIV: Mineral Resources

All minerals (including oil), and antiquities and all rights relating thereto and to treasure trove, upon,or connected with the land and water comprised in the bases or otherwise used or occupied by the United States by virtue of this Agreement, are reserved to the Government and inhabitants of the Philippines; but no rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised within the bases, without the consent of the United States. The United States shall negotiate with the proper Philippine authorities for the quarrying of rock and gravel necessary for construction of the bases.

Article XXV: Grant of Bases to a Third Power

1. The Philippines agrees that it shall not grant, without prior consent of the United states, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases, to any third power.
2. It is further agreed that the United states shall not, without the consent of the Philippines, assign, or under-let  or part with the possession of the whole or any part of any base, or of any right, power or authority granted by this Agreement, to any third power.

Article XXVII: Voluntary Enlistment of Philippine Citizens

It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right to recruit citizens of the Philippines for voluntary enlistment into the United States Armed Forces for a fixed term of years, and to train them and to exercise the same degree of control and discipline over them as is exercised in the case of either members of the United States Armed forces. The number of such enlistments to be accepted by the Armed Forces of the United states may from time to time be limited by agreement between the two Governments.

Article XXIX: Term of Agreement

The present Agreement shall enter into force upon acceptance by the two Governments and shall remain in force for a period of ninety-nine years subject to extension thereafter as agreed by the two Governments.

Annex "A"

1. Clark Field Airbase, Pampanga
2. Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga
3. Mariveles Military Reservation, POL Terminal & Training Area, Bataan
4. Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center, Baguio
5. Army Communications System with the deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila Area
6. U.S.AF Cemetery No.2, San Francisco, Delmonte, Rizal
7. Angeles General Depot, Pampanga
8. Leyte-Samar Naval Base including shore installations and air bases
9. Subic bay, No.West Shore Naval Base Zambales province and the existing naval reservation at Olongapo and the existing Baguio naval reservation
10. Tawi Tawi Naval Anchorage and small adjacent land areas
11. Canacao-Sangley Point Navy Base, Cavite province
12. Bagobantay Transmitter Area, Quezon city, and associated radio receiving and control sites, Manila area
13. Tarumpitao point (Loran Master transmitter Station), Palawan
14. Talamputan Island, C.G. #354 Loran, Palawan
15. Naule Point (Loran Station, Zambales)
16. Castillejos, C.G.#356, Zambales

Annex "B"

1. Mactan Island Army and Navy Airbase
2. Florida Blanca Airbase, Pampanga
3. Aircraft Service Warning Net
4. Camp Wallace, San Fernando, La Union
5. Puerta Princesa Army and Navy Air Base including Navy Section Base and Air Warning Sites, Palawan
6. Tawi Tawi Naval Base, Sulu Archipelago
7. Aparri Naval Air Base

Sources:

• A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, senate Doc. #123, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1950 
• THE PHILIPPINES READER, A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance, Edited by Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen Rosskamm Shalom (1987) I HIGHLY RECOMMEND THIS BOOK AND ITS PUBLISHER 

(See/click also: http://www.thefilipinomind.com/2006/10/continuity-and-turning-points-in-us.html on U.S. Foreign policy by Stephen.R. Shalom)

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U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES, March 21, 1947

Editor's Note: The RP-US Military Assistance Agreement (1947) was the sister agreement to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement (1947). It created the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), a contingent of US military advisers permanently deployed in the Philippines and whose work is focused facilitating the logistical & training requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for counter-insurgency/internal warfare. JUSMAG and this Military Assistance Agreement are jointly responsible as to why after more than 40 years of special relations, the Philippines does not yet have an external defense capability. It may be now considered as the sister agreement to the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement since the RP-US Military Bases Agreement is now defunct.
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Considering the desire of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to obtain assistance in the training and development of its armed forces and the procurement of equipment and supplies therefore during the period immediately following the independence of the Philippines, considering the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, signed March 14, 1947, and in view of the mutual interest of the two governments in matters of common defense, the President of the United States of America has authorized the rendering of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines towards establishing and maintaining national security and towards forming a basis for participation by that Government in such defensive military operations as the future may require, and to attain these ends, the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America have agreed as follows:

TITLE I.

PURPOSE AND DURATION

ARTICLE 1.- Subject to mutual agreements, the Government of the United States of America will furnish military assistance to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces and in the performance of other services essential to the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon the Republic of the Philippines under its international agreements including commitments assumed under the United Nations and to the maintenance of the peace and security of the Philippines, as provided in Title II, Article 6, hereof.

ARTICLE 2.- This Agreement shall continue for a period of five years from July 4, 1946 unless previously terminated or extended as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 3.- If the Government of the Republic of the Philippines should desire that this Agreement be extended beyond the stipulated period, it shall make a written proposal to that effect at least one year before the expiration of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4.- This Agreement may be terminated before the expiration of the period of five years prescribed in Article 2, or before the expiration of an extension authorized in Article 3, by either Government, subject to three months' written notice to the other Government.

ARTICLE 5.- It is agreed on the part of the Government of the Philippines that title to all arms, vessels, aircraft, equipment and supplies, expendable items excepted, that are furnished under this Agreement on a non-reimbursable basis shall remain in the United States of America.

TITLE II

GENERAL 

ARTICLE 6.- For the purposes of this Agreement the military assistance authorized in Article 1 hereof is defined as the furnishing of arms, ammunition, equipment and supplies; certain aircraft and naval vessels, and instructions and training assistance by the Army and Navy of the United States and shall include the following:

(a) Establishing in the Philippines of a United States Military Advisory Group composed of an Army group, a Navy group and an Air group to assist and advise the Republic of the Philippines on military and naval matters;

(b) Furnishing from the United States sources equipment and technical supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of Philippines armed forces of such strength and composition as mutually agreed upon;

(c) Facilitating the procurement by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines of a military reserve of United States equipment and supplies, in such amounts as may be subsequently agreed upon;

(d) Making available selected facilities of United States Army and Navy training establishments to provide training for key personnel of the Philippine armed forces, under the conditions hereinafter described.

TITLE III

MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP

ARTICLE 7.- The Military Advisory Group shall consist of such number of United States military personnel as may be agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 8.- The functions of the Military Advisory Group shall be to provide such advice and assistance to the Republic of the Philippines as has been authorized by the Congress of the United States of America and as is necessary to accomplish the purposes set forth in Article 1 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 9.- Each member of the Military Advisory Group shall continue as a member of the branch of the armed forces of the United States to which he belongs and serve with that group in the rank, grade or rating he holds in the armed forces of the United States and shall wear the uniform thereof, as provided in current regulations. Officers and enlisted men so detailed are authorized to accept from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines offices and such pay and emoluments thereunto appertaining as may be offered by that Government and approved by the appropriate authorities of the United States, such compensation to be accepted by the United States government for remittance to the individual if in the opinion of the appropriate authorities of the United States such course appears desirable.

ARTICLE 10.- Members of the Military Advisory Group shall serve under the direction of the authorities of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 11.- All members of the Group shall be on active duty and shall be paid regularly authorized pay and allowances by the Government of the United States of America, plus a special allowance to compensate for increased cost of living. This special allowance shall be based upon a scale agreed upon by the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America and shall be revised periodically. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall reimburse the Government of the United States of America for the special allowance provided for in this Article. The special article shall be applicable for the entire period each member of the group resides in the Philippines on duty with the Group, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement.

ARTICLE 12.- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees to extend to the Military Advisory Group the same exemptions and privileges granted by Article V, XII, and XVIII of the Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases, signed March 14, 1947.

ARTICLE 13.- Except as may be otherwise agreed upon by the two Governments, the expense of the cost of transportation of each member of the Military Advisory Group, his dependents, household effects, and belongings to and from the Philippines shall be borne by the Government of the United States of America to the extent authorized by law. Members of the Group shall be entitled to compensation for expenses incurred in travel in the Republic of the Philippines on official business of the Group and such expenses shall be reimbursed to the Republic of the Philippines except for expenses of travel by the transportation facilities of the Group.

ARTICLE 14.- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall provide, and defray the cost of, suitable living quarters for personnel of the Military Advisory Group and their families and suitable buildings and office space for use in the conduct of official business of the Military Advisory Group. All living and office quarters shall conform to the standards prescribed by the United States military services for similar quarters. Official supplies and equipment of American manufacture shall be provided without cost by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Official supplies and equipment of other than, American manufacture, shall be provided without cost by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The cost of all services required by the Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 
ARTICLE 15.- All communications between the Military Advisory Group and the Republic of the Philippines involving matters of policy shall be through the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Philippines or the Charge d' Affaires.

ARTICLE 16.-

(a) The provisions of Articles XIII and XXI of the Agreement of March 14, 1947 between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases are applicable to the Military Advisory Group, it being agreed that the Headquarters of the Military Advisory Group will be considered a temporary installation under the provisions of Article XXI of the Agreement aforementioned.

(b) The Chief of the Military Advisory Group, and not to exceed six (6) other senior members of the group to be designated by him, will be accorded diplomatic immunity.

TITLE 1V

LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE

ARTICLE 17.- The decision as to what supplies, services, facilities, equipment and naval vessels are necessary for military assistance shall be made by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States.

ARTICLE 18.- Certain initial equipment, supplies and maintenance items shall be furnished gratuitously by the United States in accordance with detailed arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. Additional equipment and supplies other than those surplus to the needs of the United States required in the furtherance of military assistance shall be furnished by the United States subject to reimbursement by the Republic of the Philippines on terms to be mutually agreed upon. All items of arms, munitions, equipment and supplies originating from sources other than those surplus to the needs of the United States shall be furnished only when the requisite funds have been specifically appropriated by the Congress of the United States.

ARTICLE 19.- The Government of the Republic of the Philippines agrees that it will not relinquish physical possession or pass the title to any and all arms, munitions, equipment, supplies, naval vessels and aircraft furnished under this Agreement without the specific consent of the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE 20.- Military equipment, supplies, and naval vessels necessary in connection with the carrying out of the full program of military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines shall be provided from Philippine and United States sources in so far as practicable and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall procure arms, ammunitions, military equipment and naval vessels from governments or agencies other than the United States of America only on the basis of mutual agreement between the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall procure United States military equipment, supplies and naval vessels only as mutually agreed upon.

TITLE V.

TRAINING ASSISTANCE

ARTICLE 21.- As part of the program of military assistance the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be permitted to send selected students to designated technical and service schools of the ground, naval and air services of the United States. Such students shall be subject to the same regulations as are United States students and may be returned to the Philippines without substitution, for violation of such regulations. Numbers of students and detailed arrangements shall be mutually agreed upon and shall be kept at a minimum for essential requirements. All Philippine requests for military training of Filipino personnel shall be made to the Government of the United States through the Military Advisory Group.
TITLE VI.

SECURITY

ARTICLE 22.- Disclosures and exchanges of classified military equipment and information of any security classification to or between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America will be with the mutual understanding that the equipment and information will be safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of the military security classification established thereon by the originating Government and that no re-disclosure by the recipient Government of such equipment and information to their governments or unauthorized personnel will be made without specific approval of the originating Government.

ARTICLE 23.- So long as this Agreement, or any extension thereof, is in effect the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall not engage or accept the services of any personnel of any Government other than the United States of America for duties of any nature connected with the Philippine armed forces, except by mutual agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.

TITLE VII.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement in duplicate, in the City of Manila, this twenty-first day of March, 1947.


For the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:

MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines

For the Government of the United States of America:

PAUL V. MCNUTT
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of the Philippines

Source: http://www.yonip.com/archives/vfa/VFA-000007.html

 “Colonies do not cease to be colonies because they are independent” – Benjamin Disraeli, British Prime Minister (1804-1881)

“A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.” – Martin Luther King, Jr.

Comparative facts about scavenging at military sites (within the U.S.):

VFA in the Philippines

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Removing Restrictions On Foreign Troops On Cha-Cha Agenda: Troops From 12 Countries Set To Enter RP

The administration appears set to allow unspecified numbers of foreign military personnel into the country in early May 2009 for "disaster relief training exercises" despite the absence of treaties giving this legal basis as required by the Constitution.

20 April 2009

IBON Features - This disregard for the charter's restriction on the presence of foreign troops and facilities in the country clearly shows that removing this is on the administration's Charter change (Cha-cha) agenda.

The United States (US) and the Philippines will co-sponsor the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR) to be held in Central Luzon on May 4-8. The ASEAN Secretariat reports that the activity is a "civilian-led, military supported" disaster relief training exercise with 12 countries "[providing] assets, personnel, and capabilities": US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, European Union and the Philippines. At least eight other countries will participate as observers.

The ARF, which was launched in 2004, is projected as the "premier regional political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region". The ARF has the "war on terror" on its broad political and security agenda, and also includes so-called transnational crimes, disarmament of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction, etc. In line with US military doctrines and practice, disaster relief training such as in the ARF VDR is among the pretexts for advancing such security agenda.

The real intent of the VDR as pushed by the US Pacific Command (PACOM) and the Philippine government since early 2008 is a multinational/regional military exercise to improve interoperability among ARF nation militaries under the de facto leadership of the US. The ARF is seen to fulfill the strategic objectives of the US in Southeast Asia, which are to maintain its hegemony and prevent being excluded from the region by the big East Asian powers (i.e. Japan or China) or by any significant grouping of smaller countries, to preserve free access to major sea lanes in the region, and to expand trade and investment opportunities in Asian countries.

However that kind of overtly multi-country military exercise is prevented by the Philippines not having Visiting Forces Agreements (VFAs) with any other country aside from the US. Talks are still just on-going with Australia and Brunei for such pacts. But even the US-RP VFA has been criticized for, among other things, not yet having been ratified by the US Senate as required by Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution.

Since the fundamentally political and security agenda of the ARF VDR will not be advanced by a genuinely civilian activity, the participation of foreign militaries will still be significant.

The VDR will include demonstrations of land, air and maritime search and rescue, medical assistance/evacuation, engineering reconstruction and public relations civil-military projects. It is likely that foreign military personnel and resources will be used for air lifts, sea lifts, and medical/dental missions. Subic Bay and the former Clark airbase in particular could be used as important exercise hubs by military vessels and aircraft.

Even if downplayed any such foreign military presence is however unconstitutional. The government is certainly fully aware of this because it has since 2008 been holding numerous inter-agency meetings to try and find ways around the constitutional prohibition. The government should then be categorical that there will be no foreign troops participating in the exercises in any way that would violate the Constitutional prohibition on their presence without the required treaties.

The planned entry of foreign troops shows that the Arroyo administration's Cha-cha agenda is turning the Philippines into a country that does not only plead for foreign investments and employment abroad but also for military protection from other nations, particularly the US. This is even if the country has no known or declared enemies, unlike the US and the presence of whose troops in the country only increases the possibility of participation in wars not of our choosing and indeed of retaliation. All in all, the Cha-cha agenda further destroys the country's sovereignty and our capacity to economically and politically stand for ourselves. 

Source: IBON Features, 

http://www.ibon.org/ibon_features.php?id=30

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ADDENDUM:   In the words of the anonymous DOD official, the legal consequence of the basing agreement is that "when we depart, we don't have to clean up."




JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1994 - VOLUME 15 - NUMBER 1

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E D I T O R I A L

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A Toxic Legacy "We don't shoot birds and we don't chop down trees. There's no environmental problem here." That's how Captain A.B. Ballesteros of the Philippine Air Force responds when asked about environmental problems at Clark Air Base, the former U.S.-operated military base now maintained by the Philippine Air Force. Unfortunately, the environmental situation at Clark and at the nearby Subic Bay Naval Facility, also formerly operated by the U.S. military, is much more complicated than Capt. Ballesteros - or, more importantly, the U.S. military- would like to acknowledge. For the 45 years after World War II, Subic and Clark were the vortex from which the United States projected its military power in the Pacific region. Following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo and the Philippine Senate's rejection of a base-treaty extension, the United States withdrew from Clark in 1991 and Subic in 1992. The base operations were massive in scope, housing not just soldiers but ship repair facilities, runways, landfills, supply depots, power plants and underground oil pipelines. Operations at the bases used a wide range of toxic substances and generated an equally broad array of hazardous wastes: unexploded ordnance, PCBs, asbestos, cyanide and lead and other dangerous heavy metals among them, according to studies conducted by the World Health Organization and the U.S. General Accounting Office. The Philippine and U.S. regulatory authorities left the U.S. Navy and Air Force with wide latitude in dealing with pollution and hazardous waste disposal. U.S. service regulations require overseas bases to adhere to host country environmental regulations - as they are applied. Since Philippine enforcement of its environmental laws is lax, the standard governing the bases was lax. Some U.S. military regulations require more stringent environmental measures, but they are only internal guidelines, regularly ignored even at domestic bases. Exactly how severely the U.S. Navy and Air Force abused their largely unchecked power to degrade the environment is unclear. Only U.S. military officials have a real understanding of the extent of the toxics problem at the bases, and they are not telling. Some U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials go so far as to deny that a toxic legacy remains at the bases. Asked whether he acknowledges that hazardous wastes were left behind, one DOD official who requested anonymity answers, "I don't think so." Conclusions like those of the GAO, he asserts, are merely surmisals based on the assumption that major military and industrial complexes like Subic and Clark must have generated wastes. The DOD has stonewalled requests for information-although the DOD official claims that "We have made a good faith effort to turn over everything that bore on the issue." In 1992, the Department of the Navy stated in response to a Freedom of Information Act request that it had 80,000 documents, over 30 boxes, relating to "toxic substances, hazardous wastes and other contamination" at Subic alone. However, according to Polly Parks of the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, the U.S. organization most actively pressing on the Philippine base environmental issue, when the DOD provided information on Subic to the Philippine government in November 1993, it turned over only four binders. While the extent of the problem is unknown, it is clear that the toxics have seriously endangered the surrounding communities: When the United States pulled out of the bases, poor Filipinos in the neighboring area were allowed to sort through base landfills; among the prize scraps were steel drums, many of which contained hazardous wastes. Those barrels are now being used throughout nearby communities to catch and store water and for other purposes. Refugees displaced by the Mt. Pinatubo lava and ash flows are now living in Clark Air Base, and some are farming there. Some of the farmers are growing rice in former sewage treatment ponds. Some former base workers have reported that they were involved in or aware of the improper disposal of hazardous wastes. One former base worker, for example, told CNN that drums of cyanide were buried at Subic - and, he believes, never removed. Because the areas surrounding the bases are densely populated by poor families, pollution of area groundwater supplies with dangerous chemical solvents, pesticides or other toxics poses major, long-term risks to a large population. The contaminants also pose risks to future workers at the bases themselves. The Philippine government plans to convert Subic to an industrial and tourist zone, and Clark into an international airport or industrial zone; workers in these new operations will have no way to know about or protect themselves from hidden hazards left over from U.S. military operations. The Philippines is utterly without the resources to identify the hazards at Subic and Clark, let alone clean up the bases. If further public health and ecological damage is to be averted, the United States must accept responsibility for the mess it created - a step it has so far been unwilling to take. The DOD justifies its refusal to accept responsibility for its actions by pointing to the governing 1947 basing agreement, which specifies that the United States was not obligated to return the bases in their original condition. In the words of the anonymous DOD official, the legal consequence of the basing agreement is that "when we depart, we don't have to clean up." And the DOD simply dismisses the claim that it has an extralegal obligation to help clean up the mess it made. Asked whether the DOD had an ethical responsibility to clean up the bases, the DOD official says, "I am not an ethics adviser. ... Maybe you can check with a religious leader." But the United States does have an obligation - to the truth and to the Filipino people - to acknowledge its toxic legacy and ensure that it is handled properly. The DOD should turn over all relevant information to the Philippines, and provide technical assistance, technology and financing, so that Filipinos can properly assess the toxic threat they now must face and take appropriate clean-up actions. Source: http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1994/01/editorial.html

I highly recommend this book!!

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Hi All,

The below link will show a short list of my past posts (out of 540 posts so far) which I consider as basic topics about us native (indio)/ Malay Filipinos. This link/listing, which may later expand, will always be presented at the bottom of each future post.  Just point-and-click at each listed item to open and read. 

PLEASE POINT & CLICK THIS LINK:  

http://www.thefilipinomind.com/2013/08/primary-postsreadings-for-my-fellow.html

Thank you for reading and sharing with others, especially those in our homeland.

- Bert

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NOTES ABOUT THIS WEBLOG:

1. THE FILIPINO MIND blog contains 532 published postings you can view, as of December 12, 2012. 
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• BAYAN KO by Freddie Aguilar 
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• ”Huwad na Kalayaan” by Freddie Aguilar

THE PHILIPPINES: 1940s to 1950s - U.S. Oldest Colony

“The true Filipino is a decolonized Filipino.” – Prof. Renato Constantino (1919-1999)

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NOTES TO READERS:  Colored and/or underlined words are HTML links. Click on them to see the linked posts/articles. Forwarding this and other posts to relatives and friends, especially those in the homeland, is greatly appreciated. To share, use all social media tools: email, blog, Google+, Tumblr,Twitter,Facebook, etc. THANKS!!

Click the following underlined title/link to checkout these Essential/Primary Readings About Us Filipino Natives:

Primary Blog Posts/Readings for my fellow, Native (Malay/Indio) Filipinos-in-the-Philippines

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NOTE: In 1898, President William McKinley declared the U.S. mission in the Philippines one of "benevolent assimilation." But within weeks of McKinley's remarks, American troops embarked on a bloody campaign to stamp out an indigenous independence movement that would ultimately cost somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000 Filipino lives. Mark Twain called The Philippine-American War (The First Vietnam) (which the U.S. called the "Philippine Insurrection") "a mess, a quagmire from which each fresh step renders the difficulty of extrication immensely greater."

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Chapter 4. The Philippines 1940s and 1950s - U.S.'s oldest colony

"I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed (to) Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them [the Philippine Islands] back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or  Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) chat we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died." —William McKinley, President of the United States, 1899 1 (Bill McKinley's Conversation with God)

William McKinley's idea of doing the very best by the Filipinos was to employ the United States Army to kill them in the tens of thousands, burn down their villages, subject them to torture, and lay the foundation for an economic exploitation which was proudly referred to at the time as imperialism by leading American statesmen and newspapers.

After the Spanish had been driven out of the Philippines in 1898 by a combined action of the United States and the Filipinos, Spain agreed to "cede" (that is, sell) the islands to the United States for $20 million. But the Filipinos, who had already proclaimed their own independent republic, did not take kindly to being treated like a plot of uninhabited real estate. Accordingly, an American force numbering at least 50,000 proceeded to instill in the population a proper appreciation of their status. Thus did America's longest-lasting and most conspicuous colony ever come into being.

Nearly half a century later, the US Army again landed in the Philippines to find a nationalist movement fighting against a common enemy, this time the Japanese. While combating the Japanese during 1945, the American military took many measures aimed at quashing this resistance army, the Huks (a shortening of Hukbalahap-"People's Army Against Japan" in Tagalog). American forces disarmed many Huk units, removed the local governments which the Huks had established, and arrested and imprisoned many of their high-ranking members as well as leaders of the Philippine Communist Party.

Guerrilla forces, primarily organized and led by American officers and composed of US and Filipino soldiers of the so-called US Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), undertook police-type actions which resulted in a virtual reign of terror against the Huks and suspected sympathizers; disparaging rumors were spread about the Huks to erode their support amongst the peasants; and the Japanese were allowed to assault Huk forces unmolested. This, while the Huks were engaged in a major effort against the Japanese invaders and Filipino collaborators and frequently came to the aid of American soldiers.2

In much of this anti-Huk campaign, the United Slates made use of Filipinos who were collaborating with the Japanese, such as landlords, large estate owners, many police constables, and other officials. In the post-war period, the US restored to power and position many of those tainted with collaboration, much to the distaste of other Filipinos.3

The Huk guerrilla forces had been organized in 1942, largely at the initiative of the Communist Party, in response to the Japanese occupation of the islands. Amongst American policy makers, there were those who came to the routine conclusion that the Huks were thus no more than a tool of the International Communist Conspiracy, to be opposed as all such groups were to be opposed. Others in Washington and Manila, whose reflexes were less knee-jerk, but mote cynical, recognized that the Huk movement, if its growing influence was not checked, would lead to sweeping reforms of Philippine society.

The centerpiece of the Huk political program was agrarian or land reform, a crying need in this largely agricultural society. (On occasion, US officials would pay lip-service to the concept, but during 5O years of American occupation, nothing of the sort had been carried out.) The other side of the Huk coin was industrialization, which the United States had long thwarted in order to provide American industries with a veritable playground in the Philippines. From the Huks' point of view, such changes were but prologue to raising the islanders from their state of backwardness, from illiteracy, grinding poverty, and the diseases of poverty like tuberculosis and beri-beri. "The Communist Hukbalahap rebellion," reported the New York Times, "is generally regarded as an outgrowth of the misery and discontent among the peasants of Central Luzon [the main island]."4

A study prepared years later for the US Army echoed this sentiment, stating that the Huks' "main impetus was peasant grievances, not Leninist designs".5 Nevertheless, the Huk movement was unmistakably a threat to the neo-colonial condition of the Philippines, the American sphere of influence, and those Philippine interests which benefited from the status quo.

By the end of 1945, four months after the close of World War II, the United States was training and equipping a force of 50,000 Filipino soldiers for the Cold War.6  In testimony before a congressional committee, Major General William Arnold of the US Army candidly stated that this program was "essential for the maintenance of internal order, not for external difficulties at all".7 None of the congressmen present publicly expressed any reservation about the international propriety of such a foreign policy.

At the same time, American soldiers were kept on in the Philippines, and in at least one infantry division combat training was re-established. This led to vociferous protests and demonstrations by the GIs who wanted only to go home. The inauguration of combat training, the New York Times disclosed, was "interpreted by soldiers and certain Filipino newspapers as the preparation for the repression of possible uprisings in the Philippines by disgruntled farm tenant groups." The story added that the soldiers had a lot to say "on the subject of American armed intervention in China and the Netherlands Indies [Indonesia]," which was occurring at the same time.8

To what extent American military personnel participated directly in the suppression of dissident groups in the Philippines after the war is not known. The Huks, though not trusting Philippine and US authorities enough to voluntarily surrender their arms, did test the good faith of the government by taking part in the April 1946 national elections as part of a "Democratic Alliance" of liberal and socialist peasant political groups. (Philippine independence was scheduled for three months later—the Fourth of July to be exact.)

As matters turned out, the commander-in-chief of the Huks, Luis Taruc, and several other Alliance members and reform-minded candidates who won election to Congress (three to the Senate and seven to the House]were not allowed to take their seats under the transparent fiction that coercion had been used to influence voters. No investigation or review of the cases had even been carried out by the appropriate body, the Electoral Tribunal.9 (Two years later, Taruc was temporarily allowed to take his seat when he came to Manila to discuss a ceasefire with the government.)

The purpose of denying these candidates their seats was equally transparent: the government was thus able to push through Congress the controversial Philippine-US Trade Act—passed by two votes more than required in the House, and by nothing to spare in the Senate—which yielded to the United States bountiful privileges and concessions in the Philippine economy, including "equal rights ... in the development of the nation's natural resources and the operation of its public utilities".10 This "parity" provision was eventually extended to every sector of the Philippine economy.11 

The debasement of the electoral process was followed by a wave of heavy brutality against the peasants carried out by the military, the police, and landlord goon squads. According to Luis Taruc, in the months following the election, peasant villages were destroyed, more than 500 peasants and their leaders killed, and about three times that number jailed, tortured, maimed or missing. The Huks and others felt they had little alternative but to take up arms once again.12

Independence was not likely to change much of significance. American historian George E.Taylor, of impeccable establishment credentials, in a book which bears the indication of CIA sponsorship, was yet moved to state that independence "was marked by lavish expressions of mutual good will, by partly fulfilled promises, and by a restoration of the old relationship in almost everything except in name. ... Many demands were made of the Filipinos for the commercial advantage of the United States but none for the social and political advantage of the Philippines."13

The American military was meanwhile assuring a home for itself in the Philippines. A 1947 agreement provided sites for 23 US military bases in the country. The agreement was to last for 99 years. It stipulated that American servicemen who committed crimes outside the bases while on duty could be tried only by American military tribunals inside the bases.

By the terms of a companion military assistance pact, the Philippine government was prohibited from purchasing so much as a bullet from any arms source other than the US, except with American approval. Such a state of affairs, necessarily involving training, maintenance and spare parts, made the Philippine military extremely dependent upon their American counterparts. Further, no foreigners other than Americans were permitted to perform any function for or with the Philippine armed forces without the approval of the United States.14

By early 1950, the United States had provided the Philippines with over $200 million of military equipment and supplies, a remarkable sum for that time, and was in addition to the construction of various military facilities.15 The Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUS-MAG) reorganized the Philippine intelligence capability and defense department, put its chosen man, Ramon Magsaysay, at its head, and formed the Philippine army into battalion combat teams trained for counter-insurgency warfare.16 The Philippines was to be a laboratory experiment for this unconventional type of combat. The methods and the terminology, such as "search-and-destroy" and "pacification", were later to become infamous in Vietnam.

By September, when Col. Edward Landsdale arrived in the Philippines, the civil war had all the markings of a long, drawn-out affair, with victory not in sight for either side. Ostensibly, Lansdale was just another American military adviser attached to JUSMAG, but in actuality he was the head of CIA clandestine and paramilitary operations in the country. His apparent success in the Philippines was to make him a recognized authority in counter-insurgency.

In his later reminiscences about this period in his life, Lansdale relates his surprise at hearing from informed Filipino civilian friends about how repressive the Quirino government was, that its atrocities matched those of (or attributed to) the Huks, that the government was "rotten with corruption" (down to the policeman in the street, Lansdale observed on his own), that Quirino himself had been elected the previous year through "extensive fraud", and that "the Huks were right", they were the "wave of the future", and violence was the only way for the people to get a government of their own. (The police, wrote a correspondent for the Saturday Evening Post, were "bands of uniformed thieves and rapists, more feared than bandits ... the army was little better.")17

Lansdale was undeterred. He had come to do a job. Accordingly, he told himself that if the Huks took over there would only be another form of injustice by another privileged few, backed by even crueller force. By the next chapter, he had convinced himself that he was working on the side of those committed to "defend human liberty in the Philippines".18

As a former advertising man, Lansdale was no stranger to the use of market research, motivation techniques, media, and deception. In CIA parlance, such arts fall under the heading of "psychological warfare". To this end, Lansdale fashioned a unit called the Civil Affairs Office. Its activities were based on the premise—one both new and suspect to most American military officers—that a popular guerrilla army cannot be defeated by force alone.

Lansdale's team conducted a careful study of the superstitions of the Filipino peasants living in Huk areas: their lore, taboos, and myths were examined for clues to the appropriate appeals that could wean them from supporting the insurgents. In one operation, Lansdale's men flew over these areas in a small plane hidden by a cloud cover and broadcast in Tagalog mysterious curses on any villagers who dared to give the Huks food or shelter. The tactic reportedly succeeded into starving some Huk units into surrender.19

Another Lansdale-initiated "psywar" operation played on the superstitious dread in the Philippine countryside of the asuang, a mythical vampire. A psywar squad entered a town and planted rumors that an asuang lived in the neighboring hill where the Huks were based, a location from which government forces were anxious to have them out. 

Two nights later, after giving the rumors time to circulate among Huk sympathizers in the town and make their way up the hill, the psywar squad laid an ambush for the rebels along a trail used by them. When a Huk patrol passed, the ambushers silently snatched the last man, punctured his neck vampire-fashion with two holes, held his body by the heels until the blood drained out, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks, as superstitious as any other Filipinos, discovered the bloodless comrade, they fled from the region.20

Lansdale regularly held "coffee klatsches" with Filipino officials and military personnel in which new ideas were freely tossed back and forth, a la a Madison Avenue brain session. Out of this came the Economic Development Corps to lure Huks with a program of resettlement on their own patch of farm land, with tools, seeds, cash loans, etc. It was an undertaking wholly inadequate to the land problem, and the number that responded was very modest, but like other psywar techniques, a principal goal was to steal from the enemy his most persuasive arguments.21  

Among other tactics introduced or refined by Lansdale were: production of films and radio broadcasts to explain and justify government actions; infiltration of government agents into the ranks of the Huks to provide information and sow dissension; attempts to modify the behavior of government soldiers so as to curtail their abuse of people in rural areas (for the Huks had long followed an explicit code of proper conduct towards the peasants, with punishment meted out to violators), but on other occasions, government soldiers were allowed to run amok in villages—disguised as Huks.22

This last, revealed L. Fletcher Prouty, was a technique "developed to a high art in the Philippines" in which soldiers were "set upon the unwary village in the grand manner of a Cecil B. De Mille production".23 Prouty, a retired US Air Force colonel, was for nine years the focal point officer for contacts between the Pentagon and the CIA. He has described another type of scenario by which the Huks were tarred with the terrorist brush, serving to obscure the political nature of their movement and mar their credibility:

In the Philippines, lumbering interests and major sugar interests have forced tens of thousands of simple, backward villagers to leave areas where they have lived for centuries. When these poor people flee to other areas, it should be quite obvious that they in turn then infringe upon the territorial rights of other villagers or landowners. This creates violent rioting or at least sporadic outbreaks of banditry, that last lowly recourse of dying and terrorized people. 

Then when the distant government learns of the banditry and rioting, it must offer some safe explanation. The last thing that regional government would want to do would be
to say that the huge lumbering or paper interests had driven the people out of their ancestral homeland. In the Philippines it is customary for the local/regional government to get a 10 percent rake-off on all such enterprise and for national politicians to get another 10 percent. So the safe explanation becomes "Communist-inspired subversive insurgency." The word for this in the Philippines is Huk.24

The most insidious part of the CIA operation in the Philippines was the fundamental manipulation of the nation's political life, featuring stage-managed elections and  disinformation campaigns. The high-point of this effort was the election to the presidency, in 1953, of Ramon Magsaysay, the cooperative former defense department head.

Lansdale, it was said, "invented" Magsaysay.25 His CIA front organizations—such as the National Movement for Free Elections—ran the Filipino's campaign with all the license, impunity, and money that one would expect from the Democratic or Republican National Committees operating in the US, or perhaps more to the point, Mayor Daley operating in Chicago. Yet the New York Times, in an editorial, was moved to refer to the Philippines as "democracy's showcase in Asia."26 

The CIA, on one occasion, drugged the drinks of Magsaysay's opponent, incumbent president Elpido Quirino, before he gave a speech so that he would appear incoherent. On another occasion, when Magsaysay insisted on delivering a speech which had been written by a Filipino instead of one written by Lansdale's team, Lansdale reacted in a rage, finally hitting the presidential candidate so hard that he knocked him out.27 

Magsaysay won the election, but not before the CIA had smuggled in guns for use in a coup in case their man lost.28

Once Magsaysay was in office, the CIA wrote his speeches, carefully guided his foreign policy, and used its press "assets" (paid editors and journalists) to provide him with a constant claque of support for his domestic programs and his involvement in the US-directed anti-communist crusade in southeast Asia, as well as to attack anti-US newspaper columnists. So beholden was Magsaysay to the United States, disclosed presidential assistant Sherman Adams, that he "sent word to Eisenhower that he would do anything the United States wanted him to do—even though his own foreign minister took the opposite view".29 

One inventive practice of the CIA on behalf of Magsaysay was later picked up by Agency stations in a number of other Third World countries. This particular piece of chicanery consisted of selecting articles written by CIA writer-agents for the provincial press and republishing them in a monthly Digest of the Provincial Press. The Digest was then sent to congressmen and other opinion makers in Manila to enlighten them as to "what the provinces were thinking".30

Senator Claro M. Recto, Magsaysay's chief political opponent and a stern critic of American policy in the Philippines, came in for special treatment. The CIA planted stories that he was a Communist Chinese agent and it prepared packages of condoms labeled "Courtesy of Claro M. Recto—the People's Friend". The condoms ail had holes in them at the most inappropriate place.31

The Agency also planned to assassinate Recto, going so far as to prepare a substance for poisoning him. The idea was abandoned "for pragmatic considerations rather than moral scruples."32

After Magsaysay died in a plane crash in 1957, various other Filipino politicians and parties were sought out by the CIA as clients, or offered themselves as such. One of the latter was Diosdado Macapagal, who was to become president in 1961. Macapagal provided the Agency with political information for several years and eventually asked for, and received, what he felt he deserved: heavy financial support for his campaign. {Reader's Digest called his election: "certainly a demonstration of democracy in action".)33

Ironically, Macapagal had been the bitterest objector to American intervention in the Magsaysay election in 1953, quoting time and again from the Philippine law that "No foreigner shall aid any candidate directly or indirectly or take part in or influence in any manner any election."34

Perhaps even more ironic, in 1957 the Philippine government adopted a law, clearly written by Americans, which outlawed both the Communist Party and the Huks, giving as one of the reasons for doing so that these organizations aimed at placing the government "under the control and domination of an alien power".35

By 1953 the Huks were scattered and demoralized, no longer a serious threat, although their death would be distributed over the next few years. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent their decline was due to the traditional military force employed against them, or to Lansdale's more unorthodox methods, or to the eventual debilitation of many of the Huks from malnutrition and disease, brought on by the impoverishment of the peasantry. Long before the end, many Huks were also lacking weapons and ammunition and proper military equipment, bringing into question the oft-repeated charge of Soviet and Chinese aid to them made by Filipino and American authorities.36

Edward Lachica, a Filipino historian, has written that "The Kremlin did pay lip service to the Communist movement in the Philippines, praising the Huks for being part of the 'global struggle against the U.S.', but no material support was offered."37 

"Since the destruction of Huk military power," noted George Taylor, "the social and political program that made the accomplishment possible has to a large extent fallen by the wayside."38

Fortress America, however, was securely in place in southeast Asia. From the Philippines would be launched American air and sea actions against Korea and China, Vietnam and Indonesia. The Philippine government would send combat forces to fight alongside the United States in Vietnam and Korea. On the islands' bases, the technology and art of counter-insurgency warfare would be imparted to the troops of America's other allies in the Pacific.

REFERENCES:

1. Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (Boston, 1916) vol. 2, pp. 110-11; from a talk given to a visiting group from the Methodist Episcopal Church.
2. US actions against Huks during Second World War:
a) D.M. Condit, Bert H, Cooper, Jr., et al., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume 1, The Experience in Asia (Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 481, research performed for the Department of the Army.
b) Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York, 1953, although completed in June 1949) pp. 147-62, 186-211, the autobiography of the Huks' commander-in-chief who surrendered to the government in 1954.
c) William J. Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy (New York, 1974) pp. 74-7; Pomeroy is an American who served in the Philippines during the war where he encountered the Huks. After the war, he returned to fight with them he until he was captured in 1952,
d) George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership (New York, 1964) p. 122 (see note 1.! below).
e) Eduardo Lachica, Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (Manila, 1971) pp, 112-
3, 116-7.
f) Philippines: A Country Study (Foreign Area Studies, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1983-84) p. 43, prepared for the Department of the Army.
3. Taruc, chapter 22; Pomeroy, pp, 77-8; Taylor, pp. 116-20.
4. New York Times, 19 December 1952, p. 13
5. Philippines: A Country Study, p. 44
6. New York Times, 5 January 1946, p. 26
7. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in executive session, 7 June 1946, released in 1977, p. 31. Arnold was the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
8. American servicemen's protests: New York Times, 8 January 1946, p. 3; 11 January, p. 4; for more information see Mary-Alice Waters, G.I.'s and the Fight Against War (New York, 1967), pamphlet published by Young Socialist magazine.
9. New York Times, 20 May 1946, p. 8; 2 June, p. 26; 4 June, p. 22 (letter from Tomas Confessor, prominent Filipino political figure, detailing the illegality of not seating the men); 18 September, p. 4; 19 September, p. 18; Pomeroy, p. 20; Taruc, pp.
214-27; Lachica, pp. 120-1.
10. New York Times, 12 March 1947, p. 15; the words are those of the Times; Lachica, p.121.
11. Pomeroy, p. 28, explains how this came about.
12. Taruc, chapters 23 and 24; Pomeroy, p. 78; the Philippine Army reported that 600 deaths had occurred from their incursions into Huk areas in the month following the electron (New York Times, 20 May 1946, p. 8) but no breakdown between military and non-military casualties was given in the press account; see also Lachica, p.121.
13. Taylor, pp. 114, 115. The book was published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. for the Council on Foreign Relations, the ultra high-level think-tank whose officers and directors at the time included Allen Dulles, David Rockefeller, and John J. McCloy. Praeger, it was later disclosed, published a number of books in the 1960s under CIA sponsorship- This book, though generally reasonable on most matters, descends to
the puerile and semi-hysterical when discussing the Huks or 'communism'.
14. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949 (Washington, 1974) pp. 84-9; Pomeroy, pp. 21-3; Taylor, p. 129.
15. New York Times, 1 July 1946, $50 million furnished; 11 February 1950, p. 6, $163.5 million furnished under the 1947 agreement.
16. Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York, 1972) passim; Stephen Shalom, "Counter-insurgency in the Philippines" in Daniel Schirmer and Stephen Shalom, eds., The Philippine Reader (Boston, 1987) pp. 112-3.
17. William Worden, 'Robin Hood of the Islands', Saturday Evening Post, 12 January 1952, p. 76.
18. Lansdale, pp. 24-30,47.
19. Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior [New York, 1976) p. 95 (see note 30 for Smith's back-ground).
20. Lansdale, pp. 72-3.
21. Ibid., pp. 47-59.
22. Ibid., pp. 70-1, 81-3, 92-3; Smith, p. 106; Taruc, pp. 68-9; for further description of this propaganda campaign, see Shalom, pp. 115-6.
23. Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, US Air Force, Ret., The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the World (Ballantine Books, New York, 1974, paperback) pp.
38-9.
24. Ibid., pp. 102-3.
25. Smith, p, 95, quoting CIA officer Paul Lineberger.
26. New York Times, 16 October 1953, p. 26
27. Interviews by author Thomas Buell of Ralph Lovett, CIA Chief of Station in the Philippines in the early 1950s.and of Lansdale; cited in Raymond Bonnet, Waltzing With a Dicatator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York, 1987) pp. 39-40. See also New York Times, 31 March 1997, p.l
28. Bonner, p. 41
29. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York, 1961) p. 123.30. For an overall derailed description of CIA manipulation of Philippine political life, and of Magsaysay in particular, see Smith, chapters 7, 15, 16, 17. Smith was a CIA officer who, in the early 1950s, worked in the Far East Division, which includes the
Philippines, concerned with political and psychological-warfare matters.
31. Smith, p. 280
32. Buell interview of Lovett (see note 27), cited in Bonnet, p. 42.
33. Reader's Digest, April 1963, article entitled "Democracy Triumphs in the Philippines".
34. Smith, p. 290
35. House Bill No. 6584, Republic Act No. 1700, approved 20 June 1957.
36. Huks' condition: New York Times, 3 April 1949, p. 20; 30 June 1950, p. 4.
37. Lachica, p. 131
38. Taylor, p. 192

SOURCE: KILLING HOPE - U.S. MILITARY & CIA INTERVENTION SINCE WORLD WAR II
                - William Blum, ZED Books LONDON, 2003

Also: http://killinghope.org/

Forwarding the posts to relatives and friends, ESPECIALLY in the homeland, is greatly appreciated. Use emails, Twitter, Google+, Facebook, etc. THANK YOU !!!

U.S. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith: "I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better you will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States." Major Littleton W. T. Waller: How young? Smith: Ten years and up. --Exchange on October 1901, quote from the testimony at Smith's court martial by the New York Evening Journal (May 5, 1902). General Smith, a veteran of the Wounded Knee Massacre, was popularly known as "Hell Roaring Jake" or "Howling Wilderness".

**********************************************END OF POST*****************************************

Hi All,

The below link will show a short list of my past posts (out of 540 posts so far) which I consider as basic topics about us native (indio)/ Malay Filipinos. This link/listing, which may later expand, will always be presented at the bottom of each future post.  Just point-and-click at each listed item to open and read. 

Thank you for reading and sharing with others, especially those in our homeland.

- Bert

PLEASE POINT & CLICK THIS LINK:  

http://www.thefilipinomind.com/2013/08/primary-postsreadings-for-my-fellow.html

NOTES ABOUT THIS WEBLOG:

1. THE FILIPINO MIND blog contains 532 published postings you can view, as of December 12, 2012. 
2. The postings are oftentimes long and a few readers have claimed being "burnt out."  My apologies. The selected topics are not for entertainment but to stimulate deep, serious thoughts per my MISSION Statement and hopefully to rock our boat of  ignorance, apathy, complacency and hopefully lead to active citizenship.
3. All comments are welcomed for posting at the bottom window. Comments sent by email will also be posted verbatim. However, ANONYMOUS COMMENTS WILL BE IGNORED.
4. Visit my other website, click --> SCRIBD/TheFilipinoMind, or the SCRIB FEED at the sidebar, or type it on GOOGLE Search to read or download ebooks and PDFs of essays I have uploaded.  Statistics for my associated website:SCRIBD/theFilipinoMind : ALL FREE AND DOWNLOADABLE: 123 documents, 207,458 reads
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6. Translate to your own language. Go to the sidebar and Click on GOOGLE TRANSLATOR (56 languages - copy and paste sentences, paragraphs and whole articles, Google translates a whole posting in seconds, including to Filipino!!).
7. Forwarding the posts to relatives and friends, ESPECIALLY in the homeland, is greatly appreciated. Use emails, Twitter, Google+, Facebook, etc. THANK YOU !!!
8. Songs on Filipino nationalism: please reflect on the lyrics (messages) as well as the beautiful renditions. Other Filipino Music links at blog sidebar.  Click each to play.:

• BAYAN KO by Freddie Aguilar 
• ”Bayan Ko” by KUH LEDESMA 
• ”Bayan Ko” by a Korean choir 
• ”Sa Kuko ng Agila” by Freddie Aguilar 
• ”Huwad na Kalayaan” by Freddie Aguilar