To those who wonder "why dig the past": We engage in revisiting and revising our past, i.e. historical "revisionism", to develop new emphases and raise new questions on assumptions and explanations for key historical issues and policies --given by our former colonial master America, government officials and authors of history books, then and now.
In our homeland's case, we can not afford a "balanced" approach to history since in the past and present years, our homeland's history, as it refers to Philippine-US relationships, has been imbalanced in favor of the Americans, who as far as we baby boomers can remember, are only "the good guys" and "do-gooders" in history.
t is time for us, especially for fellow native Filipinos-in-the-Philippines to recover our history, a nationalist history, which necessitates uncovering the lies and myths about America; since the American arrival into and 50-year occupation of our homeland, the sweet nothings about "Philippine-American Special Relations", etc. perpetuated through our school textbooks, mass media, government pronouncements, Filipinos with Americanized minds, etc.
We Filipinos, here and abroad, past and present, relied and continue to use these official explanations that lead only to our ignorance of hidden truths and knowledge of untruths, thus perpetuating the post-WW2 neocolonial conditions that brought only worsening impoverishment to the masses; foreign control of the national economy and its plunder of our national patrimony.
Though somewhat dated today, Ms. Francisco's historical essay below demonstrates and reminds us that our subjugated forefathers were nationalists and knowledgeable about true democracy versus hypocrisy in the American gospel of Manifest Destiny.
As Ms. Francisco alluded to in the Introduction and to which I heartily agree (and which the late, great nationalist Prof. Renato Constantino has consistently referred to/talked/written about), "the most serious cancer of twentieth-century Philippine society has been the traumatizing effect of mystification and false consciousness regarding the American colonial period."
Our miseducation has created an Americanized mind that is THE major stumbling block to our being truly Filipino (i.e. a decolonized Filipino.) and working for the native,common good.
- Bert, 5/03/2012
The First Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine War of 1899
*With apologies to Mexicans, American Indians and other early victims of American imperialism.
For the student of Philippine history, such a state of affairs is not merely discouraging or upsetting, it is tragic. This is true for many reasons, but it is especially true for one reason in particular. The degree to which Filipino false consciousness exists is the measure of American success in obliterating from popular consciousness knowledge of what American historians have chosen to call (when they refer to it at all, which is seldom) the so-called “Philippine Insurrection” (America’s Hidden War of 1899). 1
Most Americans have never heard of it, most Filipinos understand it only through the prism of the victors' own account of how the war was waged and won. And yet the Philippine-American War was one of those illuminating moments of history which threw a shaft of light on an era. As far as Filipinos are concerned, an understanding of our liberation struggle at the turn of the century is without question or doubt the prerequisite, the starting point for a genuine understanding of modern Philippine society.
With such a view in mind and within the limits of this essay, attention will be focused on the three aspects of the war which are the most critical and yet, for reasons which are perhaps obvious, have attracted the least amount of attention, let alone analysis. Therefore, attention will not be focused so much on the war against Spain, which preceded the Philippine-American War, nor will it deal with the political infighting in the Malolos Government or General Emilio Aguinaldo's surrenderist prevarications. Attention will be focused on the nature of America's policy of aggression, the depth of popular mass resistance to the American forces and the duration of the struggle in what became, ultimately, suicidal refusal to capitulate to imperialism.
But two developments forced them to once again regret their sanguine reports to the War Department. First, the fighting simply continued. Chasing Aguinaldo into the mountains had made no difference, breaking up the Filipino Army made no difference, and garrisoning the archipelago simply invited guerrilla attacks on isolated outposts. Secondly, as the Americans spread their forces and their garrisons to other areas of Luzon and to other islands, they found they were confronted with exactly the same kind of public hostility and guerrilla opposition which characterized the situation in Central Luzon. The notion that opposition to the U.S. was confined to. the Tagalogs was simply wrong. The Americans were at war with seven million Filipino people and wherever they went in the Islands they took the war with them-a disconcerting state of affairs and one to which Otis could never reconcile himself.
The effort bore fruit insofar as Taft was able-on cue-to establish his Civil Government on September 1. Laced as it was with quislings and traitors-Buencamino, Legarda, Luzuriaga and, inevitably, Pedro Paterno notable among them-the Taft regime was a useful propaganda weapon and it provided the Americans with another excuse to prosecute the war. Having created puppets, the continuation of the war and the retention of the Philippines were necessary to protect those who "loyally sided with the Americans" against potential and future revenge at the hands of the guerrillas. With, one presumes, appropriate sarcasm, one American Congressman commented, " ... and so it appears that in order to keep them from shooting each other down we have got to go in and shoot them down first."20
Bryan, moreover, was a rank political opportunist. By his own admission he had supported ratification of the Paris treaty simply in order to provide himself with what he thought would be a good issue with which to attack the Republicans. When he began to see that his anti-colonial-position was hurting his campaign rather than helping, he backpedaled furiously and quickly compromised himself, arguing now for a vaguely defined American "protectorate" for the Philippines. In any event, both McKinley and Bryan perceived that the electorate was bored by the Philippine issue and by the end of the campaign it had been quietly dropped by both candidates.
If the people supported the guerrillas then the people must also be classified as the enemy. The grim implications of such an evaluation were beginning to emerge, although the fiction that widespread public support for the U.S. existed in the Islands was maintained for domestic U.S. consumption. Terrorism, it was explained, was the only reason Filipinos gave any support at all to their guerrilla brethren, the only reason people did not welcome the foreign occupying force with open arms. "Without this system of terrorism," Taft allowed, "the guerrilla campaign would have ended very quickly."22 MacArthur was not deluded by such fantasties:
the success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion; ... fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One traitor in each town would effectively destroy such a complex organization.23
The now-familiar pattern of operations began once again. All inhabitants of the island (pop. 266,000) were ordered to present themselves to detention camps in several of the larger coastal towns. Those who did not (or those who did not make it their business to learn of the existence of the order), and were found outside the detention camp perimeter, would be shot "and no questions asked." Few reporters covered the carnage; one who did noted:"During my stay in Samar the only prisoners that were made ... were taken by Waller's command;34 and I heard this act criticized by the highest officers as a mistake .... The truth is, the struggle in Samar is one of extermination."35
If anything, the Batangas campaign which followed Samar by a few months was even more "pinching"-to use the then-current euphemism for such pogroms. Indeed, General Smith could legitimately defend himself the way Waller had done. He was, in fact, simply following orders. His superior and the overall U.S. commander in the Philippines, General Chaffee, was as explicit as Smith, although he expressed himself somewhat less flamboyantly when he wrote on the eve of the Samar campaign:
... it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible; and both officers and men must be cordially supported in this duty in this regard. There is one thing necessary; and that is the wholesome fear by these people of the Army, and that every hostile motion of any inhabitants toward the troops will be quickly and severely punished. . .. It is to our interest to disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, and any means to that end is advisable.37 [emphasis added]Even if the American commanders issued inhuman and draconian orders, the War Department argued that of course the men would not actually obey them. In Senate hearings, the obsequious Beveridge was at pains to make this point:
Sen. Beveridge: The general conduct of our soldiers and officers there, irrespective of orders from headquarters, was in the direction of kindness, mercy and humanity, was it? [emphasis added]
Gen. MacArthur: Absolutely, Sir. 38
It was on the 27th of December, the anniversary of my birth, and I shall never forget the scenes I witnessed that day. As we approached the town the word passed along the line that there would be no prisoners taken. It meant we were to shoot every living thing in sight-man woman or child.
The first shot was fired by the then 1st Sergeant of our company. His target was a mere boy, who was coming down the mountain path into town astride of a carabao. The boy was not struck by the bullet, but that was not the Sergeant's fault. The little Filipino boy slid from the back of his carabao and fled in terror up the mountain side. Half a dozen shots were fired after him.The shooting now had attracted the villagers, who came out of their homes in alarm, wondering what it all meant. They offered no offense, did not display a weapon, made no hostile movement whatsoever, but they were ruthlessly shot down in cold blood, men, women and children. The poor natives huddled together or fled in terror. Many were pursued and killed on the spot. Two old men, bearing a white flag and clasping hands like two brothers, approached the lines. Their hair was white. Tbey fairly tottered, they were so feeble under the weight of years. To my horror and that of the other men in the command, the order was given to fire and the two old men were shot down in their tracks.
We entered the village. A man who had been on a sickbed appeared at the doorway of his home. He received a bullet in the abdomen and fell dead in the doorway. Dum dum bullets were used in the massacre, but we were not told the name of the bullets. We didn't have to be told. We knew what they were. In another part of the village a mother with a babe at her breast and two young children at her side pleaded for mercy. She feared to leave her home which had just been fired-accidentally, I believe. She faced the flames with her children, and not a hand was raised to save her or the little ones. They perished miserably. It was sure death if she left the house-it was sure death if she remained. She feared the American soldiers, however, worse than the devouring flames. 40
. . . sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution. If these things need be done, they had best be done by native troops so that the people of the u.S. will not be credited therewith.56With Malvar's surrender in April 1902, the Americans at long last felt the war was finally over, and Taft dutifully intoned this fact once again. The Washington Post editorialized in response:
We have learned to repose the utmost confidence in Judge Taft's opinions and predictions relative to affairs in the Philippines. Ever since he solemnly announced the fourth and final termination of hostilities two years ago, we have refused to accept any view of the situation in our new islands which did not have his sanction and endorsement. The fact that it has been brought to an end on six different occasions since the Governor's original proclamation serves only to confirm our estimation of his wisdom. A bad thing cannot be killed too often.57The surrender of Malvar completed the capture or surrender of what the Americans considered to be the "respectable military element." The only people left in the hills, it was thought, were ignorant ladrones (bandits), but they were, it was said, a traditional feature of rural life in the Philippines and were not to be taken seriously as a threat to American hegemony. Just to make sure, President Roosevelt proclaimed the war to be over on July 4, 1902. Bands played, soldiers marched in parade, speeches were read, and just the tiniest flaw marred an otherwise grand occasion. The fighting did not stop. The war would not admit to so tidy a solution. Declaring it over did not make it so. A sullen, hostile people, the victims of three and a half years of the most savage aggression, simply refused to give up.
Attempts to conduct such a survey in Misamis Province sparked off an uprising there.61 In the following year an identification card system was inaugurated and a "registration tax" was imposed on all male residents of the Philippines between 18 and 60 years of age. These Cedulas Personates, as they were called, " ... also serve the purpose of a domestic passport ..." (their obvious intended purpose), according to the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 62
American officers and sent out to engage the guerrillas, came in for some hard fighting. At Oras, Bulan's men, armed only with bolos, engaged the Constabulary troops in hand-to-hand combat and secured 65 guns. At Dolores, 38 Constabulary troops fell, prompting the American commander to plead for the reintroduction of American troops. The problem, he said, was ". . not solely one of killing and capturing the leaders or great numbers of their followers, for there are others ready to rise in their places."65 By April 1905, U.S. reinforcements had to be sent to Samar and fighting there continued for two more years.
The attempts are always preceded by a thorough spying out of the surroundings, strength and habits of the intended victims, a careful weighing of chances and a deliberate planning. Consequently, an enterprise once undertaken seldom fails. Frequently they try to minimize the risk of jumping a police station or looting a municpal treasury by establishing relations with and winning confederates on the inside.71The guerrillas were also learning how to utilize their solidarity with the people to advantage and they began to shun the uniforms they previously wore in order to facilitate intermingling with the general population. Funds were often extorted from wealthy landowners (who hoped thereby to purchase immunity from more permanent depradations) and used to purchase food and provisions from peasants. An underground communication system was established in the various areas of guerrilla operation, but interregional communication and coordination was all but totally lacking and this proved to be a fatal handicap when, as occurred in 1904-06, the resistance was progressing well in other respects.
The Americans give out and write in their papers that the Philippine Islands are completely pacified and that the Filipinos love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives, is complete and utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed with insurrection and plots, the fighting has never ceased, and the natives loathe the Americans and their theories, saying so openly in their native press and showing their dislike in every possible fashion. Their one idea is to be rid of the U.S.A . ...76By 1906 the ultimate futility of engaging in continued resistance without regional coordination, without agreed-upon aims, without more than the most rudimentary ideological overview, and without any hope-or thought-of international support for their movement took its predictable toll. By mid-year, Sakay, Montalon and De Vega had surrendered and this ended whatever flickering hopes might have remained for the re-establishment of the Philippine Republic.
For American troops grown callous by years of fighting against non-combatants, attacking such communities necessitated no departure from previously established norms. The resultant slaughter from such wanton tactics, however, was fearful. In March 1906, American troops killed over 600 men, women and children in an assault on the Mount Dajo community. Photographs of the neaped bodies of women and children created a sensation in the U.S., but this did not reflect itself in any alteration of American policy. Sporadic fighting continued to flare up in Mindanao as late as 1916, and martial law was not lifted until December 1906. Even then, the preparedness of the Moslem community to lay down their arms was due simply to the recognition that superior force of arms had been brought to bear against them, nothing more.
Within the anti-imperialist camp, class antagonisms were muted, both because they were not understood and because of the need to present a united nationalist front. But the latent class contradictions were always present, and they began to surface in the second and third year of the war against the Americans with the defection of a number of army officers. These men came largely from middle-class backgrounds and, with a few notable exceptions, were prone to elitist thinking and surrenderist attitudes. The speed and apparent ease of conscience with which many such men were able to take up posts within the American colonial bureaucracy was to a large degree attributable to their class solidarity which, on the evidence, was stronger than their racial and ethnic ties to the Indio peasants.
2. Literature on the war is woefully skimpy and no adequate political analysis now exists. Little Brown Brother by Leon Wolff (Manila: Erehwon, 1968) is an excellently written popular introduction. Domestic U.S. reaction to the war has received far more attention than the war itself, especially in recent years. Daniel Schirmer's Republic or Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971) is the best recent accountt of the anti-imperialist, or, more accurately, the anti-colonialist movement in the U.S.
3. At least insofar as the Treaty of Paris was concerned. Had the treaty not been approved, theoretically the Islands would have been retained by Spain, although as a practical matter the Spanish were hardly in a position to reassert themselves in the Islands. It seems improbable also that the McKinley Administration would have withdrawn U.S. troops simply on the basis of the treaty vote, had it gone against them.
4. Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 226.
5. Forty-five hundred dead bodies were counted by the Americans. Witnesses estimated the total number of dead to be 8-10,000. H. Van Mete~, The Truth About the Philippines from Official Records and Authentic Sources (Chicago: Liberty League, 1900), p. 333.
6. Van Meter, 332.
7. Van Meter, 368.
8. Father of Douglas, World War II commander in the Pacific.
9. Van Meter, 366.
10. Eyot, Canning, ed., The Story of the Lopez Family (Boston: J. H. West Co., 1904), 23.
11. MacArthur later admitted, "The Filipino idea behind the dissolution of their field army was not at the time of occurrence well understood in the American camp. As a consequence, misleading conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had been destroyed and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of the rebel army." Renato Constantino, Dissent and Counter-Consciousness (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), 80, quoting War Department Annual Reports, 1901, vol. I, part 4,88.
12. Senate Document no. 331, vol. 2; 57:1 (1902), 1926-27.
13. Wolff, 294. Robinson, who reported for the New York Evening Post, was by far the most courageous American newsman in the Philippines. His outspoken reporting won him hasty re-assignment to Africa.
14. Senate Doc. no. 331, vol. 2, 57:1, pp. 1927-28. Report of General MacArthur. There were 53 garrisons in November 1899, over 400 by the following August.
15. Fairfield, Maine Journal, excerpted from a letter from Sgt. Howard McFarlane, 43rd Infantry. Quoted in Wolff, 305. The soldiers who wrote such letters were invariably contacted by military authorities and forced to write retractions, which were then hastily published to refute the original information. Reading the retractions tends to confirm in one's mind the verity of the original statement. Refusal to write a retraction was not kindly looked upon by the military and the kinds of pressure tactics employed by the War Department became something of a scandal after being disclosed in Senate hearings in 1902. Senator McLaurin called it a "remarkable coincidence" that in every case where the soldier was still in the army, 'retractions were forthcoming. But when the soldier had already been discharged and was no longer subject to military discipline, " ... there was not an instance found where there was any modification, qualification or retraction of what had been said ... " Congressional Record,
57:1, May 15,1902, 5480.
16. Quoted in the Boston Transcript, January 12, 1900, cited by Wolff,299.
17. Wolff, 290.
18. Boston Herald, August 25, 1902. Quoted in Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman, Marked Severities in Philippine Warfare: Sec. Root's Record (Boston: George H. Ellis Co., 1902), 115.
19. As was McKinley, who confessed he could not find the Philippines on the map the first time he looked for them. In light of later disclosures, this remark smacks of coyness, but it is true nevertheless that the Americans had the most limited understanding of Philippine society.
20. Statement by Rep. Vandiver, Congressional Record, 57:1, May I5, 1902,5505.
21. At their peak, Spanish forces in the Philippines never numbered more than a few thousand.
22. Taft testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,69.
23. MaCArthur testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,135.
24. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2443.
25. In his first annual message to Congress, McKinley expressed his (evidently feigned) outrage at the concentration camp policy being employed in Cuba. This "cruel policy," he said, "was not civilized warfare; it was extermination." Quoted in Storey and Codman, 94.
26. Report of the Provincial Governor of Abra, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,430.
27. Wolff, 352.
28. Charles E. Magoon, Acting Chief of Division, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2263.
29. Later charged with (and eventually acquitted of) torturing 134 Filipino P.O.W.s to death.
30. Boston Herald , August 25, 1901 (quoting a letter from an American officer). Quoted in Storey and Codman, 116.
31. Chaffee to General Hughes, Manila, September 30, 1901, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2, 1592.
32. Testimony of William J. Gibbs, a survivor of the massacre. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2284 et seq.
33. Storey and Codman, 116. Congt'essional Record, 57:1, May 15,1902, 5525.
34. Major Waller was later court martialed for his actions in Samar, one suspects in retaliation for his refusal to engage in the extermination practices of his fellow officers. During the course of his trial he revealed the nature of Smith's orders and the public disclosure created a sensation in the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt (McKinley's successor upon the latter's assassination in 1901), in order to neutralize outraged public opinion, had Smith himself brought up on charges. The charges did not stem from any overt act of the Samar campaign (it is recalled that the War Department had "no record" that the orders were actually carried out) but rather because the orders themselves were "unprofessional." Smith was convicted, "admonished" by the tribunal, and sentenced to "early retirement." Smith became something of a cause celebre in jingoist circles, causing Roosevelt to regret his actions: "The court martial of General Smith cost me votes-votes'" (Schirmer, 239 n).
35. Stephen Bonsal, Boston Transcript, quoted in Storey and Codman, 38.
36. Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senate Doc. no. 205, 57:1, part I, pp. 2,3.
37. Chaffee to Gen. Hughes, September 30, 1901, quoted in Storey and Codman, 28.
38. Senate Doc. no. 422,57:1,5.
39. It should be remarked that not all of the U.S. soldiers reveled in the bloodlust of their commanders. Many were repulsed by what they had witnessed and experienced in the Philippines and were anxious to expose American policy upon their return to the U.S. Others took to drink or went mad. Alcoholism and insanity followed venereal disease as the major cause for the reduction in available U.S. manpower in the Philippines. Desertion was difficult due to geographical factors, but incidences of officers being shot in the back "by snipers" were not unheard of, and a handful of Americans actually joined with and fought with the guerrillas (see Ellwood Bergerey, Why Soldiers Desert from the U.S. Army (Philadelphia: William Fell & Co., 1903), 132.
40. Cpl. Richard O'Brien, New York World, reprinted in the Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15, 1902, 5500.
41. Root to Lodge, Army and Navy Journal, AprilS, 1902. Reprinted in Storey and Codman, 88.
42. Senate Doc. no. 205,57:1, part I, p. 50.
43. Senate Doc. no. 422, 57:1, p. 19.
44. Senate Doc. no. 422,57:1, p. 4.
45. Address before the Marquette Club, Chicago, March II, 1902. Quoted in Frederick Chamberlin, The Blow from Behind (Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1903), 109.
46. Eyot, 146-47.
47. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552 et seq.
48. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552.
49. James H. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines (Manila: Malaya Books, 1968), 388.
50. Storey and Codman, 71-72.
51. Storey and Codman, 73. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2, pp. 1628,1690-1.
52. Storey and Codman, 91.
53. Senate Doc. no. 331, 57:1, part 2, p. 1632.
54. Storey and Codman, 92-93.
55. Philippine Census, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), vol. 2, p. 20. Comparing the 1903 figures with the Spanish figures of 1887, Batangas lost 54,000 people in absolute terms, making no allowance for intervening population rise. Estimating on the basis of an annual population increase of 1.5 percent, it is certain that Batangas was depopulated by 100,000 or more.
56. Report of Major Corneliu~ Gardiner, Governor of Tayabas, Congressional Record, 57: I, May 1S, 1902, 5500. By native troops Gardiner was referring to the Macabebes, a tiny, pro-U.S. ethnic sub-group which had played a praetorian role during the Spanish regime and for this reason was well hated by the majority of Filipinos.
57. Congressional Record, 57: 1, May 16, 1902, 5542.
58. A current diversion in some areas of the Filipino left of late has been to try to decide which guerrilla leaders were principled revolutionaries and which were opportunist manipulators. Few-if any-of these men can withstand such a rigorous and, ultimately, unfair historical test, precisely because all of them lacked one or more of the following: (a) a revolutionary ideology; (b) a theory of imperialism; (c) anything other than a primitive understanding of the class nature of the struggle in which they were engaged; (d) an understanding of protracted warfare and guerrilla strategy. There was no real experience (except their own) upon which they could draw, nor was there a historical example known to them of the successful prosecution of such a struggle. They fought by their wits and their instincts alone, which led in turn to terrible reversals and, ultimately, .defeat in an uneven, suicidal struggle doomed from the start. So all of them to one degree or another fail the exacting test of their modern critics.
Simeon Ola surrendered, betrayed his men, and turned state's witness against them. Macario Sakay was tricked into surrendering for principled (but tactically faulty) reasons and was betrayed and executed by the Americans, who had previously promised amnesty. Artemio Ricarte survives better than most, and for years after 1910 he waged an almost singlehanded struggle from abroad. But, sadly, in old age he could not see that Japanese and American imperialism were cut from the same cloth. "Papa" Isio finally surrendered, one suspects, because at the age of sixty-seven and after more than twenty-five years in the mountains the rigors of guerrilla life"simply got to be too much. And so it went. To hold such men against a standard which has only slowly evolved in the course of the 20th century seems to miss the point. Given the historical context within which the struggle was enjoined, how can it reasonably be expected that it could have evolved differently? The real heroes were not so much the leaders, who served their people with a greater or lesser degree of fidelity and ability, but the people themselves. A simple point, perhaps, but one which I believe bears making.
59. The struggle in the Philippines never degenerated into social banditry in the strict sense of the term, although in its later stages several of the guerrilla organizations developed into "Robin Hood"-type bands. The fascinating history of such movements as they have occurred historically and in various parts of the world has been largely ignored by orthodox historians, partly, no doubt, because of the inherent difficulties in researching such phenomena. The opportunities for such work in the Philippines are immense. The reader is directed to the pioneering work of E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York: Praeger, 1959) and Bandits (New York, 1971).
60. Report of the Governor of Albay, in Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), part 1, Appendix H, 144. Blount, 49.
61. Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1903), part 1, p. 30.
62. Report of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1905), part 4, p. 177.
63. Blount, 453.
64. Cable, Governor Feito to Carpenter, August 9,1904. Quoted in Blount, 461.
65. Report of Col. Wallace C. Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission Appendix A, 54.
68. Report of H. H. Bandholtz, Commander, Second District Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 69.
69. Ibid., 69.
70. Ibid., 78.
71. Report of D. J. Baker, Provincial District Commander, ibid., part 3, Appendix A, 130.
72. Report of W. S. Scott, 53.
73. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), part 1, pp. 3031. I am not aware of any of the prominent leaders of 1899-1902 going back into the field after a spell of civilian life under American rule, although there may have been isolated cases where this did occur.
74. Euphoria at the outcome of that war was not, of course, confined to Japan and the Philippines. News of the Japanese victory electrified the masses of people in Southeast Asia generally, e.g., Indochina, where guerrilla war was being waged against the French.
75. Report of Maj. Samuel D. Crawford, Commanding Officer, Fourth District, Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 101-2.
76. Blount, 505, quoting Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, An Englishwoman in the Philippines, 88.
77. Which of course it did. Testimony of Frank J. Bourns, First (Schurmann) Report of the Philippine Commission, part 2, p. 356.
78. Ibid., 355-56, 414-16. Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commssion, part 2, p. 311. The story of the short-lived Negros Republic and, more importantly, the development of the social forces which led to its founding have not, to my knowledge, been adequately treated by Filipino historians, which points up the sorely felt need for regional histories of the Philippines.
79. Report of Colonel Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 88.
80. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), part 1, p. 142.
81. Report of Colonel Bandholtz, First District, Philippine Constabulary, ibid., part 2, p. 239.
'Politicians and the media have conspired to infantilize, to dumb down, the American public. At heart, politicians don't believe that Americans can handle complex truths, and the news media, especially television news, basically agrees.' —Tom Fenton, former CBS foreign correspondent
NOTE: U.S. soldiers torturing a Filipino, 1901. When the U.S. military water-boarded Filipinos, the practice was accepted. When the Japanese later water-boarded U.S. personnel in World War II, America tried them for war crimes. (Ohio University)
and yet deprecate agitation
are men who want crops without
plowing up the ground;
they want rain without thunder and
They want the ocean without the
awful roar of its waters.
This struggle may be a moral one
or it may be a physical one
or it may be both moral and physical
but it must be a struggle.
Power concedes nothing without a
It never did, and never will." – Frederick Douglass, American Abolitionist, Lecturer, Author and Slave, 1817-1895)
- THE FILIPINO MIND blog contains 532 published postings you can view, as of December 12, 2012.
- The postings are oftentimes long and a few readers have claimed being "burnt out." My apologies. The selected topics are not for entertainment but to stimulate deep, serious thoughts per my MISSION Statement and hopefully to rock our boat of ignorance, apathy, complacency and hopefully lead to active citizenship.
- All comments are welcomed for posting at the bottom window. Comments sent by email will also be posted verbatim. However, ANONYMOUS COMMENTS WILL BE IGNORED.
- Visit my other website, click --> SCRIBD/TheFilipinoMind, or the SCRIB FEED at the sidebar, or type it on GOOGLE Search to read or download ebooks and PDFs of essays I have uploaded. Statistics for my associated website:SCRIBD/theFilipinoMind : ALL FREE AND DOWNLOADABLE: 123 documents, 207,458 reads
- Some postings and other relevant events are now featured in Google+, BMD_Facebook, BMD_Twitter and BMD_Google Buzz and Google+.
- Translate to your own language. Go to the sidebar and Click on GOOGLE TRANSLATOR (56 languages - copy and paste sentences, paragraphs and whole articles, Google translates a whole posting in seconds, including to Filipino!!).
- Forwarding the posts to relatives and friends, ESPECIALLY in the homeland, is greatly appreciated. Use emails, Twitter, Google+, Facebook, etc. THANK YOU !!!
- Songs on Filipino nationalism: please reflect on the lyrics (messages) as well as the beautiful renditions. Other Filipino Music links at blog sidebar. Click each to play.: